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This essay outlines the features of globalization in the current era and indicates how 
conceptualizations of this process differ from the related formulations of the Annales School and of 
World Systems Analysis. The main theme of the paper is then developed, namely an assessment of the 
ways that globalization has impacted the organization of work and the structure of employment 
careers. This assessment is based on results from a variety of recent research studies, especially on 
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INTRODUCTION 
Few terms have entered our lexicon with as profound an impact on policy discourse as the notion of 
globalization. For some, the globalization process carries the promise of unleashing productive forces 
that will reduce poverty and raise living standards throughout the world, in both industrialized and 
less developed countries. Others, however, see in this phenomenon a new strategy for the exploitation 
of politically weak and economically backward countries by the powerful nations of Europe and 
North America and by their artful agent, the multinational corporation.  
 
As a generic term for heightened international commerce and multi-nation political organization 
globalization is not a new process, though what is unique in the present incarnation is its sustained 
impact on the lives of individuals in a great many countries and its unifying neo-liberal agenda. There 
have been kindred phenomena in earlier centuries--empires and colonial powers that had a global 
reach, at least within the then known world. However, those were extensions of powerful nation-states 
and had the character of political and economic arrangements consciously devised for the benefit of 
the home country, whether by creating captive markets or dominating sources of raw materials. 
Globalization in its modern expression is quite different; at least in principle the economic outcomes 
from the neo-liberal trade policies central to the formulation emerge from transactions that take place 
in a neutral marketplace.  
 
Representative multinational political organizations, such as the League of Nations and the United 
Nations, have largely been at the sidelines in the formation and governance of the modern variant of 
globalization, which is characterized by a press to eliminate trade barriers and harmonize national 
economies to facilitate the flow of capital, commerce, and labor. Several agencies of the UN, such as 
the International Labor Organization and the World Health Organization, have had to contend in 
their own activities with the consequences of globalization, but the parent body has not been a central 
player in the governance of this process. The European Union is an exception to the relative absence 
of multinational political actors in the unfolding of globalization. Though formulated at the level of a 
continent, the European Union was an early adopter of many of the free market policies associated 
with globalization, especially a single market, central bank, and a common currency--the last perhaps 
the ultimate sign of market integration. Through its Commission for Competition and other agencies, 
the European Union has also moved further in regulating market liberalization than have countries 
outside this community. 
 
Rather than reflecting the design decisions of a representative body of nations, the features of 
globalization, as we know it, are an outgrowth of recent technological developments and a succession 
of ad hoc trade agreements contracted, in the main, by the United States since the Reagan 
administration (e.g., the US-Chile Free Trade Agreement, US-Australia Free Trade Agreement, 
NAFTA [US-Canada-Mexico Free Trade Agreement]), with the goal of removing barriers to 
international commerce. The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade 
Organization, all dominated by US interests, have also been major players in the globalization process, 
pressing less developed countries to lower trade barriers and reduce the involvement of their 
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governments in the domestic economy as a condition for receiving financial assistance (e.g., the 
Washington Consensus1). 
 
It is certainly the case that globalization has come upon us quickly; the first use of this term in its 
modern meaning dates to 1962 (Chanda 2003). Perhaps as a consequence of its origins, globalization 
is seen as postulating a dizzying set of relationships between free markets and social welfare, individual 
freedom, and democracy, as well as responsible for some perverse outcomes such as heightened 
inequality within countries, terrorism, the propagation of pathogens, climate change, and the like. 
With this complexity of potential effects, the unfolding of globalization has been the source of much 
anxiety, contention, and vilification, and has stimulated a rich body research that has sought to clarify 
its still emerging impacts. Against this background, the intent of the present essay is to clarify the 
dimensions of the globalization process and the way it differs from related formulations, and discuss 
the particular matter of how globalization has impacted the organization of work and the structure of 
employment careers, especially in western countries.  
 
 
THE GLOBALIZATION PROCESS 
What, in fact, is meant by this term? According to the International Monetary Fund (2002), 
globalization refers to the growing economic interdependence of countries as a result of heightened 
cross-national transactions of goods and services, the free flow of capital, cross-border migration, and 
the rapid diffusion of new technologies. Bhagwati (2004, p. 3) provides a similar definition though he 
speaks of economic globalization, while Reich (2007) uses the term "supercapitalism," though with 
much the same referent. While technological and economic developments may be the driving force 
behind globalization, other accounts are more expansive in their description of the process and 
encompass many of the effects of the new developments in the definition. Thus, the Global Policy 
Forum (2006) includes the impact on politics, culture, law, social movements, and the environment 
in its description of globalization. However, for the purposes of relating the root phenomenon to its 
consequences, the more restrictive definition is preferred. 
The technological developments that underlie globalization derive from advances in the second half of 
the 20th century in communications, information processing, and transportation. The declining cost 
of computing and the growth of fiber networks and communication satellites permit the rapid 
transmission of vast amounts of information nearly instantly. These developments have given rise to 
new corporate arrangements and employment practices, based on teleprocessing, outsourcing, and 
"virtual enterprises"--organizations that come into being for the execution of a specific project and 
then dissolve. 
 
By better linking countries, these technological advances have made possible a heightened integration 
of national economies. As noted earlier, this integration is proceeding along the lines of the neo-liberal 
economic policies favored by developed countries, with the goal of reducing barriers to the flow of 
                         
1An understanding among the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the US Treasury in the 1980s 
regarding the elements to be included in a standard aid and economic reform package (Stiglitz 2003, p. 16). 
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goods, capital, and labor. Underlying this agenda is the view that free markets promote efficiencies 
through competition and a division of labor, permitting states to specialize in what each can best do. 
Global commerce offers an opportunity to access diverse sources of capital and technology, and 
provides a large export market (International Monetary Fund 2002). These gains, however, are 
accompanied by deep risks from volatile capital movements, the loss of manufacturing jobs to other 
nations, greater within-country inequality, and the growing autonomy of multi-national corporations 
(Stiglitz 2006, chaps. 1-4)). Added to this list is the rise of super-national regional entities like the 
European Union, that are absorbing some of the authority traditionally wielded by countries to 
control the flow of commerce across their borders. This development is reducing the relevance of the 
nation-state in the lives of its residents, opening the possibility of an erosion of loyalty, especially in 
multi-ethnic countries where this commitment is problematic (e.g., Belgium).  
 
Related formulations of global change  
There is a rich literature of comparative state studies that predates the emergence of the current phase 
of globalization. In recent decades comparative empirical research has been particularly informative 
about European countries, owing to generous support from the European Community for multi-state 
surveys and to the harmonizing of country-level data sets (e.g. the European Community Household 
Panel, Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe, the Luxemburg Income Survey). Using 
materials of these sorts, Esping-Anderson and his followers have constructed influential typologies of 
social welfare regimes, reflecting the historical traditions and institutional arrangements in Europe and 
North America (e.g., Esping-Andersen 1990; 1996; Goodin, et. al 1999; Alcock and Craig 2001)). 
Bradshaw and Hatland (2006) and Kaufmann et. al. (2002), among others, have examined family 
policy and work arrangements; also comparative investigations of income inequality and economic 
well-being have been reported for the European countries by Pontusson (2005), Wolff (2004), and 
Atkinson (1995). 
 
An essential difference between these studies and the current globalization literature stems from the 
presumption in the latter of an unrelenting, driving force that is responsible for the massive economic 
transformations brought to the world in recent decades. The comparative state literature, by contrast, 
largely entails static comparisons of policies and structures, and attributes country differences to the 
specifics of local history, tradition, and religion. With the exception of natural processes such as 
climate change, these studies do not posit the operation of powerful exogenous forces that are 
responsible for the global trends. 
 
This is not to suggest that the social sciences lack for grand theories that embody a dynamic of change 
and that purport to explain societal development on a global level. Marxian theory, for one, views the 
long sweep of history in terms of a progression of institutional arrangements that are compatible with 
the productive order in an era--feudalism, capitalism, and socialism--with the struggle between classes 
in each production system generating the institutional change. Some neo-Marxians--e.g., Dobbs and 
Sweezey--have engaged in a debate over whether the driving force behind the transformation from 
feudalism to capitalism was endogenous to each country or driven by exogenous factors such as the 
growth in cross-nation trade (Sinha 2004, p. 3; Wallerstein 2004, p. 14); the latter position, 
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incidentally, with its stress on the role of the world market, anticipates the type of formulation used in 
the exegesis of globalization effects. 
 
Braudel and his associates in the Annales school also adopted a global perspective in accounting for the 
succession of civilizations and viewed long stretches of human history in terms of cycles in climate, 
population, and food production, modulated by the “gentle rhythms” of social history--i.e., the 
growth and decline of economies, states, and societies (Braudel 1980, pp. 3-5). Analogously, World 
Systems Analysis, an outgrowth of the Anneles school, takes the world as the unit of analysis and seeks 
to examine the overlapping networks of interaction and exchange by social and economic units that 
are at different conceptual levels--individuals, families, firms, states, transnational actors--with the goal 
of identifying the properties of the global system (Wallerstein 2004, pp. 16-22; Chase-Dunn and 
Grimes 1995, pp. 388-391). 
 
Nonetheless, the formulations of the Annales school and of World Systems Analysis, while global in 
scope and dynamic in their focus on change processes, differ from the specifications used in 
globalization studies in several respects. Unlike the literature on globalization, they do not presume 
the operation of a single, or a narrow set of driving forces that underlie the change. Wallerstein (2004, 
p. 21) is emphatic on this point: “[W]orld-systems analysis lacks a central actor in its recounting of 
history. ... [The various actors in other theoretical systems are seen here as] part of a systemic mix out 
of which they emerged and upon which they act.” The earlier formulations also depart from the 
globalization literature in that the primal drive, whether conceived as a systemic mix of factors or more 
narrowly, as in the case of Marxian historiography, tends to be conceptualized as an inexorable force 
of nature that is beyond the control of the impacted nations. In studies of globalization, by contrast, 
the engine of development and change is an outcome of intention and design, the result of negotiated 
agreements among nation-states to advance a neo-liberal agenda.  
 
Another difference from the earlier formulations relates to the treatment of time. The prior depictions 
of world transformations measured time in centuries and millennia, with neither the rate of change 
nor the forces underlying the transformations visible to the inhabitants of a country. Wars, plagues, 
and famines may have been witnessed, but without a sense of an unfolding trajectory of development. 
In contrast, what is unique in the current era is the compression of time, with the emergence of global 
effects comparable in magnitude to those of the earlier transformations but in a temporal frame that is 
measured in decades, not centuries. 
 
GLOBALIZATION EFFECTS ON STRATIFICATION 
One indicator of the rapid emergence of globalization as a factor in people’s lives is provided by the 
growth of the literature on this topic. According to Guillen (2001, p. 239), in 1980 there were 89 
entries in Sociological Abstracts with the words “global” or “globalization” in the title, subject 
heading, or abstract. By 1990 the number had grown to 301 and in 1998 it reached 1009. A similar 
count from books in print shows an increase from 48 to 589 in the same period. Along with the 
growth in number of publications, there has been an expansion in the diversity of issues subsumed 
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under this theme. These now include assessments of the impact of globalization on a variety of 
economic and political institutions as well as on cultural mores, some several steps removed from the 
technological and market changes that are at the core of this phenomenon.  
 
Much of this literature has been summarized in several comprehensive review papers; see, for example, 
Gunter and van der Hoeven (2004) regarding globalization effects on migration, education, and 
training; Fischer (2003) on fiscal and investment impacts; Brady et. al. (2007) and O’Riain (2000) on 
consequences for political organization and democracy; Yeniyurt (2003) on multinational 
corporations in the age of globalization; Thorin (2003) on gender effects; Halliday and Osinsky 
(2006) on legal developments; and Guillen (2001) on controversies about the consequences of 
globalization, such as whether or not it is leading to convergences of institutional arrangements in 
different countries. Also, a full issue of Contemporary Sociology (1996) was devoted to a literature 
review of globalization effects.  
 
In this essay I restrict attention to recent studies of the way that the global trends have influenced 
aspects of stratification systems. In particular, I examine how various categories of workers have fared 
under the neo-liberal trade policies, and how the institutional arrangements of different countries have 
succeeded in filtering or mitigating the disruptive effects from this unfolding process. 
 
The fate of labor under globalization  
The move to a global economy has had a profound impact on employment opportunities and on the 
features of work careers. These effects have not been uniform across occupational groups, and the 
consequences for labor market processes have been quite different in the capitalist countries of Europe 
and North America than in less developed states that have recently joined the global economy. 
 
 The entrance of large population states--China, India, Indonesia--into the world economy has 
doubled the size of the global workforce engaged in non-agricultural activity. This has had the effect 
of lowering the global capital/labor ratio, shifting the balance of power in market relations towards 
capital and away from labor (Freeman 2005). Countries must now compete vigorously with one-
another for capital, as this is a major determinant of labor productivity and, correspondingly, of wages 
and living standards.  
 
The western industrialized countries face a problem of retaining capital-intensive, high value-added 
jobs in their ambience. Many less developed nations have been rapidly raising the education level of 
their workforce--China, for one, already graduates more engineers and scientists each year than the 
United States (Freeman 2005). Since capital is mobile, multi-national corporations are able to offshore 
research and development as well as routine production activities, taking advantage of the lower wage 
rates for technical workers in emerging economies. This has put great pressure on wages in the 
industrialized countries. Labor unions have little recourse but to mitigate their contracts demands in 
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order to keep manufacturing facilities from departing to locales in the developing world (World 
Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization 2004, p. 77). 
 
The rationale used to justify a commitment to globalization is that world production would be 
maximized and all nations benefit if each were to specialize in what it does best. In the industrialized 
nations, with their large pools of educated, skilled workers, there has been an expectation that while 
low-skill jobs might migrate abroad, they would continue to dominate in research and development of 
high value-added goods. Correspondingly, the less developed countries would presumably specialize in 
labor intensive manufacturing, which would provide pools of much needed jobs for their unskilled 
populations.  
 
As envisioned by industrialized countries, the globalization of markets would permit them to grow the 
proportion of their labor force engaged in capital-intensive work, thereby supporting a high wage 
economy and enhanced living standards. Indeed, it is such a vision that underlies the intense interest 
by recent US administrations in raising educational attainment and explains their recent insistence on 
school accountability. The intent is to prepare the labor force for the impending buildup in demand 
for highly skilled labor--a recognition that a very different economy is in the process of unfolding. 
Evidence of the potency of this transition can be found in the increasing income returns to college 
graduates during the past 20 years relative to high school completion; the unmistakable conclusion is 
that the demand for less educated workers in western countries has been declining (Mishel 2005. et. 
al. pp. 151-156).  
 
Yet, this assessment of the impact of globalization appears to be only partially correct. There has, 
indeed, been a migration of labor intensive manufacturing to less developed regions with low wage 
rates. However, at the same time, the large population countries of the developing world, especially 
India and China, have sizeable pools of educated workers even though the percentage of college 
graduates in those countries is small. These pools of skilled workers have proven to be an irresistible 
attraction to multi-national corporations seeking to reduce their wage costs for technically trained 
workers. 
 
This points to a second consequence of globalization for labor market opportunity in the developed 
world. Digitalization of paperwork and the teleprocessing of computer files permit many 
technologically advanced tasks to be carried out in distant locales, far from the end-use consumer. 
Computer programming, technical support services, radiological analysis, accounting functions, and 
other back office operations are now routinely performed in low wage countries, with the effect that 
demand for these professional specialties is lessened in the US and Europe (Sachs 1996). This threat to 
western dominance of high value added jobs was not foreseen at the beginnings of globalization, but it 
is a predictable outcome of investments by less developed countries in the education of their 
workforce, in combination with the easy movement of capital in an integrated world economy. 
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Thus, in the developed world, the relative positions of capital and labor have shifted, with capital the 
clear winner. With the reduction of import tariffs and the removal of hindrances to capital flows, there 
is little need for corporations to locate production in the countries in which their goods will be 
consumed (Andersen 2006). Globalization has eroded the barrier rents previously imposed by national 
boundaries, permitting corporations to uproot their plants on short notice and relocate production to 
another region when this bolsters profit. Facilitating such moves is the growing preference by 
corporations for spot contracts with local firms that undertake much of the manufacturing and 
assembly of commodities for households in the West. This arrangement lessens “sunk costs” by a 
contracting company and increases its flexibility to transfer production to another country, or to 
threaten to do so in order to secure concessions from unions or governments (International Labor 
Organization 2000). 
 
Globalization poses two additional threats to the developed world. First, it is responsible for an 
immense growth in the power of large corporations to the detriment of national governments, to the 
point that Marc Blondel, Secretary General of the French Confederation of Labor described public 
authorities as, at best, subcontractors of the process--"the market governs, the government manages" 
(quoted in Sachs 1996). Second there is a concern that "sovereign funds"--the huge financial pools 
controlled by national governments--may be used to influence the policies of nation-states through 
strategic investments. These funds largely derive from the upsurge in demand for raw materials, 
stimulated by the emergence of new and powerful economies on the global scene. In the short run, the 
revenue from sales of the raw materials is too large to be efficiently absorbed by the producing 
countries, giving rise to these large monetary pools that are currently valued at some three trillion 
dollars (Davis 2008, p. A9; Murray 2008, p. A2).  
 
The impact of globalization on developing countries has been less studied, though it is equally 
profound. Among these states comparative advantage is provided by education, but also by the 
presence of a large pool of English language speakers. Similar to our comments on educational 
attainment, the percentage of English speakers in a country is less relevant than the numerical size of 
the group. In India, for example, where much technical work is performed for western countries, only 
four percent of the population is proficient in English; this amounts, however, to some 40 million 
English speakers (Crystal 1995). A lack of familiarity with spoken English and, to a lesser extent, with 
other western languages, is one reason for the much smaller presence of China, Taiwan, and Korea as 
providers of technical support services to western countries. 
 
Losers among the less developed countries include ones that were early entrants into the global 
economy and now have a work force that commands moderate wage rates. Mexico and Colombia, for 
example, have been shedding production jobs to the countries of South East Asia, which have even 
lower labor costs (Freeman 2005). Also, farmers in less developed states have been hurt by imports of 
foodstuffs, often surplus production from western countries that is provided free or at low cost as part 
of an assistance program. At the same time, to protect their own farmers, the western countries impose 
stiff import tariffs on agricultural products. Because less developed countries tend to have large 
agricultural sectors, some analysts have suggested that the West should reformulate its policies, to 
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either eliminate tariffs on agricultural imports from the world’s poorest regions or provide cash 
assistance rather than surplus food shipments (e.g., Birdsall 1999). 
 
The less developed countries have also been buffeted by the externalities from globalization--the 
internal migration of rural workers to cities with inadequate housing and sanitation, the rapid 
building of factories with poor pollution controls, the weak labor unions and consequent inadequate 
job protections. With this said, the multinational corporations that have expanded into developing 
countries often pay higher salaries and provide better working conditions than local firms serving the 
domestic economy (International Labor Organization 2000).  
 
Taking a long view, it may well be the case that what we are witnessing are the fits and starts of less 
developed countries as they attempt to move to a more or less equal footing in the global economy. 
Each state begins from a particular skill base, cultural tradition, institutional arrangements, and a set 
of attractions to multinational corporations. Drawing from the experiences of India and China, it 
appears that, initially, the labor force of a developing country is used by multinationals to provide 
them with standardized products. But skill transfers are inevitable, if only to make the local firms 
more efficient in the service of their masters. The trajectories of India and China suggest that, with the 
build-up of a local skill base, native entrepreneurs can expand their firms, moving from suppliers to 
multinationals to developers of their own products. India and China now have corporations that 
emulate the western multinationals, developing their own technologies and contracting for production 
with firms in other developing countries. Indeed, Infosys, Wipro, and Lenovo are emerging 
powerhouses that compete with the established multinationals of western states (Giridharadas 2007, p. 
A1). Which countries will succeed in moving through these stages, and which will stagnate, is an open 
question and requires a nuanced grasp of the structural and cultural factors that make for rapid 
economic progress while maintaining the fabric of social stability. At a theoretical level this question 
relates to whether globalization fosters niche development or a uniform trajectory of progression. 
 
GLOBALIZATION AND LABOR MARKET PROCESSES IN EUROPE 
A matter of some interest concerns the way globalization has affected the structure of work careers and 
the lives of workers, along with the related issue of the policies adopted by countries to mitigate 
insecurity and workforce dislocations. There is a consensus that competitiveness in the global 
economy requires flexible labor arrangements--limitations to protections from dismissal, the ability of 
firms to replace long duration employees with fixed term and part time workers, and a move from 
national and industry level union bargaining to company level negotiations (Sachs 1996; International 
Labor Organization 2000; Uchitelle 2007). The intent of these adjustments is to give employers the 
flexibility to expand and reduce their work forces in accordance with product demand, without having 
to add full time employees who have protections from layoff. 
 
The European countries provide a particularly interesting site for examining the various approaches 
that have been implemented for enhancing labor market flexibility while affording some protection to 
household income. While the European Union has sought to harmonize the economic and social 
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policies of its members, the individual countries differ in historical tradition, culture, and material and 
human resources, which, collectively, have given rise to disparate adaptations to the dislocations 
brought by globalization. An essential aspect of the country strategies concerns the extent to which 
active labor market policies are pursued (retraining programs, public employment services, targeting of 
problematic populations such as school dropouts) versus more passive social programs (employment 
protections, generous unemployment compensation, retirement policies) [Pontusson 2005, chap. 6]. 
The former permits a country to maintain a high level of employment together with flexible labor 
arrangements but addresses household income indirectly, while the latter targets household income 
and seeks to manage excesses in labor supply through static mechanisms such as by legislating an early 
retirement age with full pension benefits. 
 
France, Germany, and Italy are generally noted as having the most rigid and protective employment 
policies; the Anglo-Saxon countries as having the weakest safeguards for workers. Recent OECD data, 
cited in Pontusson (2005, p. 120), support this assessment, whether using an index of employment 
protection or a measure of employment tenure. In terms of the latter, the averages are 11.2, 10.3, and 
12.1 years for the first set of countries, but 8.3 and 6.7 for the United Kingdom and the United 
States, respectively. In regard to expenditures on active labor market programs, Denmark and Sweden 
are at the top, whereas the United States and the United Kingdom show the smallest percentages of 
GDP allotted for this purpose (Pontusson 2005, p. 126), with the central European countries largely 
in the middle. Yet, these two programmatic strategies--active and passive policies--do not necessarily 
represent alternatives: France and Germany have high values on both and the correlation across 
countries in government spending on the two types of programs is positive (Pontusson 2005, Table 
6.3). 
 
The European countries have been categorized by several researchers in terms of features of their 
political economies. Such classifications provide a useful entry for assessing the relation between a 
country’s institutional arrangements and its approach to the challenges of globalization. Esping-
Andersen (1990), for one, distinguishes between “liberal,” “social democratic,” and “conservative” 
capitalist systems, with the categories reflecting the way that the provision of social welfare relates to a 
country’s market economy; variants of his formulation have been offered by Goodin, et. al. (1999) 
and by Hall and Soskice (2001). Building on these specifications, Pontusson (2005, p. 17) 
distinguishes between “liberal market economies (LMEs)” and two types of “social market economies 
(SMEs)”--Nordic and continental versions. Briefly, SMEs differ from LMEs in having strong unions, 
institutionalized collective bargaining, extensive public welfare and employment protections. The 
Nordic countries stand out in having higher union density and a greater reliance on the public 
provision of social services. Thus, collective bargaining coverage in year 2000 was 83% for the Nordic 
SMEs, 75% for the continental countries, and 36% for the liberal market economies (Pontusson 
2005, table 2.2).  
 
From an examination of the OECD countries, Pontusson (2005, p. 94) concludes that the LMEs 
appear to have done better in regard to labor market performance--they have higher rates of job 
creation and shorter durations of unemployment. Also, despite arguments to the contrary (e.g., Sachs 
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1996), the pattern of national and industry-wide union negotiations in the Nordic SMEs appears to 
be responsible for a tradition of wage restraint in labor bargaining, a critical factor in the lesser 
inequality in northern Europe than elsewhere on the continent. Thus, 90-10 wage ratios for the 
Nordic SMEs, continental SMEs and the LMEs are, respectively, 2.23, 2.64, and 3.77 (Pontusson 
2005, Table 3.4). 
 
Pontusson reports considerable material about the institutional arrangements and economic 
performance of individual European states, especially ones that are outliers in his classification of the 
capitalist economies. However, the most comprehensive assessment of labor market adjustments by 
the countries of Europe in response to the dislocations from globalization comes to us from the 
Globalife project 
 
The impact of globalization on career features  
Blossfeld and his associates have recently published four lengthy volumes of country studies from this 
project that assess the impact of globalization on labor market processes. Two are organized around 
the issues of labor force entry and the transition into retirement (Blossfeld et. al. 2005; 2006a), the 
others examine mid-career concerns in the lives of men and women (Blossfeld et. al. 2006b; 2006c). 
Because these volumes provide a wealth of material on recent developments in employment 
opportunity and job mobility, and because they are likely to influence our appraisal of the different 
national approaches to offsetting the dislocations brought about by globalization, we examine these 
studies in some detail.  
 
Following the work of Blau and Duncan (1967), Jencks et. al. (1972), Sorensen (1983), and 
Spilerman (1977), the Globalife project, directed by Hans-Peter Blossfeld, has framed its investigation 
in the vernacular of a life course perspective, but with particular stress on the institutional structures 
that frame the gross features of work careers. In emphasizing institutional arrangements they draw 
from Esping-Andersen’s (1990) categorization of welfare states but broaden and deepen the specifics 
of the institutional formulation in applying it to work careers.  
 
The approach of the Globalife project is to view work careers as involving a number of critical 
transitions which can have long term consequences for employment security and income: the move 
from schooling to first job, changes of job and employer, shifts between employment and 
unemployment, and the eventual departure into retirement. Each of these transitions is patterned by 
individual characteristics such as educational attainment and acquired skills, but also influenced in 
massive ways by the organization of the economy--e.g., the prevalence of internal labor market 
structures, the extent of employment protections written into law, possibilities for retraining and 
occupational change in mid-career, and the generosity of income supports for the unemployed and 
retired. The authors of the several country chapters proceed to assess how the impact of globalization 
on career development has been mediated by the institutional arrangements particular to each nation-
state. 
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Though the focus is on labor market processes, the Globalife project adopted a wider institutional 
perspective, treating career dynamics as embedded in a multi-institution life course framework. Thus, 
attention is given to the organization of schooling in a country (e.g., ability tracking, occupational 
licensing, linkages with employers)--a consideration that precedes labor force entry--and to how the 
success of young persons in effecting the transition into the labor market impacts family decisions 
such as departure from the parental home, marriage formation, and the timing of first childbirth. The 
perspective in the study is to see these various events, though inhabiting different institutional spheres, 
as intimately related and requiring concomitant consideration. 
 
A word about the organization of the four volumes. In preparing a set of integrated tomes the editors 
had to make a number of decisions. The first concerns the underlying conceptual formulation; as 
noted, the project focuses on critical career decisions with an emphasis on how they are molded by 
institutional arrangements. A second decision involves methodology; in the main event history 
procedures are used. A third concerns the format of the volumes. In this case, each begins with a 
theoretical chapter that outlines the main issues faced by workers at a particular career stage, then 
addresses the system shocks generated by globalization and discusses the institutional structures that 
might offset the full effects of the disruptions. A second chapter in each volume utilizes a data set with 
coverage of multiple European countries, such as the European Community Household Panel, to 
compare trends in key variables, with most of the data presented at the level of five welfare state 
categories. This material is followed by 12-15 country chapters that delve into the particularities of the 
individual states. Finally, each volume has a concluding chapter that collates the country findings and 
attempts to generalize them, with the intent of assessing the success of the different types of 
institutions in moderating the effects of globalization.   
 
Careers, then, are seen as evolving within a setting of institutional structures. In the Globalife 
formulation there are several broad configurations of institutional structures, variants of the welfare 
regime types proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990) and Pontusson (2005), among others. Blossfeld 
and his associates use the following nation-state categories: social-democratic (active labor market 
policies with a goal of full employment, gender equality, and income protection--e.g., Denmark, 
Sweden), corporatist (strong family policies, traditional gender division of labor, income protection--
Germany), familistic (similar to corporatist, emphasizes the role of kin and family in ensuring against 
social risks--e.g. Italy, Spain), liberal (passive labor market policies, modest public sector employment-
-e.g., U.S., Great Britain), and post-socialist (emerging welfare regimes--e.g., Hungary, Czech 
Republic). 
 
Globalization has internationalized markets and intensified competition, compelling employers to 
increase efficiency and enhance their suppleness in responding to shifts in product demand. With 
respect to their work force, employers have sought flexibility to layoff employees with outmoded skills, 
replace high wage and older workers with younger ones, and, in general, expand and contract a firm’s 
workforce in response to variations in product demand. However, capitalist welfare regimes differ in 
the way this sort of flexibility is build into the labor market. Paramount in the Globalife framework is 
the notion of open and closed employment systems, with the latter characterized by a large proportion 
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of the labor force in protected employment, sheltered by mechanisms such as internal labor markets 
which provide high levels of job security (Mills, et. al. 2006, pp. 19-24). 
 
From this formulation Blossfeld and his colleagues postulate that in countries with closed employment 
systems the flexibility would be obtained at the price of heightened insecurity for young workers who 
have not yet acquired job protections, for women who would be forced more into fragmented work 
careers, and for older workers who would be pressured to move into retirement. These groups would 
serve as a supplemental labor force, hired when necessary on short term contracts with few job 
benefits. For young workers this could mean long periods in the unprotected sector, a particularly 
deleterious experience given that marriage and the start of a family are often contemplated at this very 
point in the life course .  
 
The notion of open and closed employment systems interacts with welfare regime types in the 
following way. The liberal and post-socialist countries tend to have low levels of collective bargaining 
coverage and weak employment protection legislation. Thus, they are relatively “open,” with only a 
small proportion of employees having the safeguards provided by an internal labor market. The social 
democratic countries are also characterized by open employment systems that permit employers much 
flexibility, but there is greater consensus in these countries about maintaining a high rate of 
employment, and this is implemented via retraining programs to facilitate mid-career job changes and 
by a large government sector that absorbs shortfalls in worker demand in private industry. In contrast, 
conservative and familistic welfare regimes tend to have systems of closed employment that accentuate 
the insider/outsider distinction. Insiders, commonly, are male workers, who are relatively shielded 
from the uncertainties associated with flexible employment (Mills, et. al. 2006, pp. 15-27).  
 
Against this setting, the exogenous shocks of globalization have diverse impacts on the work force of 
countries that follow different welfare regime models. While all nation-states may need to adapt to the 
imperatives of a world economy, the required flexibility can be effected in various ways, and these 
“solutions” tend to be consistent with the logic and coherence of a particular regime type. Given this 
institutional apparatus, what, then, are the principal findings from the Globalife study? These can be 
most cogently summarized in accordance with the structure of the four project volumes. 
 
In their analysis of early career stages, Blossfeld, et. al. (2005) find, consistent with expectation, that 
while youth in all countries are exposed to greater uncertainty with the unfolding of globalization, the 
need for employment flexibility impacts their career prospects more severely in some employment 
regimes. In closed systems, where there is a large category of protected workers, the press for flexibility 
is absorbed by labor market outsiders--women and especially youth; they tend to be ‘losers’ in the 
globalization era. And because of the more limited opportunities for young workers in closed 
employment systems, the role of individual human capital has become critical for securing entry into 
protected career lines; this is especially the case in Italy and Spain (Mills, et. al. 2005, p. 423-29). In 
open employment systems, by contrast, the shielding of workers is less prevalent, with the career risk 
spread over a wide base rather than centered on young workers. 
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Moreover, in the conservative and familistic welfare regimes there are clear gender differences among 
youth in their response to reduced labor market opportunity. In these male breadwinner societies 
uncertainty in the employment sphere appears to impede partnering and parenthood by young men.  
At the same time, depressed labor market conditions encourages many young women to opt for 
motherhood as a way to reduce insecurity and give meaning to their lives (Mills, et. al. 2005, pp. 429-
32). However, in the liberal and social-democratic states, which follow a dual earner model, 
employment uncertainty affects young men and women in more or less similar ways, delaying their 
entrance into adulthood as indexed by age of partnering and first childbirth.  
 
The central question addressed by Blossfeld and his associates in their study of the mid-career stages of 
men (Blossfeld, et. al. 2006b) concerns whether globalization has led to an erosion of men’s standard 
employment contract. This might arise from the press by employers for greater flexibility and result in 
an increase of unstable and fragmented “patchwork careers.” A related issue concerns the extent to 
which the different welfare regimes and domestic institutions in a country have buffered the impact of 
the disruptions wrought by globalization. One broad finding is that mid-career males are fairly well 
sheltered from these instabilities, especially in closed employment systems where patchwork careers 
appear to be targeted on special groups such as youth and women (Mills and Blossfeld (2006, pp. 465-
79). The results for the liberal welfare regimes are more difficult to succinctly summarize: mid-career 
males exhibit both more upward and downward mobility than in other regime types, more transitions 
from flexible into permanent jobs, and fewer transitions into unemployment. Further, liberal regimes 
are “equally capable as corporatist regimes ... of maintaining high levels of employment security;” all 
this in the chapter by Muffels and Luijkx (2006; pp. 66-67). Nonetheless, in their summary chapter 
Mills and Blossfeld (2006, pp. 468, 479) stress the negative impact of liberal regimes, concluding that 
mid-career males, especially in the U.S., are increasingly vulnerable to uncertainty and dislocations. 
 
In regard to mid-career women (Blossfeld, et. al. 2006c), there is evidence of increased labor force 
attachment in recent years, though the trend has not been uniform. In countries in which women 
have traditionally had a weak link to the labor force their attachment has grown, while in countries 
where women have historically had a deep involvement there has been some tendency for the 
attachment to weaken (Hofmeister and Blossfeld 2006 pp. 434-36). However, there are notable 
exceptions. Sweden, in particular, with an historically high level of women’s integration into the labor 
force, has succeeded in protecting this attachment by expanding its public sector and emphasizing 
parental leave and daycare programs (Korpi and Stern 2006, p. 138). For European countries that 
have a tradition of low or moderate inclusion of women the story has been one of rising labor force 
attachment, reflecting the growing opportunity for part-time work and the rising insecurity of men’s 
employment and consequent need for wives to bolster family income. 
 
If, in the main, globalization has contributed to a higher rate of labor force attachment by women, its 
impact of the quality of their jobs has been negative. The expansion of flexible employment has meant 
easier access by women to the labor force, but also a smaller share of secure jobs with attractive 
benefits. Again, it is countries with large public sectors (e.g., Sweden, Denmark) that have been most 
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successful in shielding women from the instabilities generated by globalization. Women with high 
education, especially ones with technical skills, and younger women appear to be the best positioned 
to secure stable employment in the new global era (Hofmeister and Blossfeld 2006, p. 442). 
 
The culmination of work careers is examined in the last volume of the project (Blossfeld, et. al. 
2006a). Older worker are a particular concern for work firms in that they enjoy high wages but tend 
to have obsolescent skills and less education than young workers. Nor surprisingly, companies may 
view their elderly employees as a high cost item, to be reduced where possible. Potential options for a 
firm are to push late career workers into retirement, reduce their wages, or lay them off. In general, it 
appears that the solution adopted by firms in a particular country tends to reflect its welfare regime 
category.  
 
Thus, in the final chapter of the volume, Hofacker, et. al. (2006) conclude that in liberal welfare 
regimes, the combination of flexible markets, which permit job changes in late career, with only 
moderately compensating public pension systems have served to maintain older workers in the labor 
force. The social-democratic countries have also succeeded in keeping late career workers in the labor 
force, but by the use of quite different policies. In particular, they tend to combine continuous 
education and retraining with the sheltering role of large scale public employment (Hofacker, et. al. 
2006, p. 359). In contrast, in both conservative and familistic countries, the decline in the 
employment rate of older workers has been pronounced. This is not surprising since these countries 
have large sectors of protected employment for prime age males; it is the elderly and youth who then 
bear the burden of providing employment flexibility. 
 
Some final words about this massive project. Blossfeld and his colleagues have provided us with a 
definitive assessment of the effects of globalization on the work lives of residents of developed 
countries. In discussing the four volumes I have given attention mainly to the overview and 
synthesizing chapters of each, and even here I have provided little more than a sample of their 
intricately woven assessments. The individual country chapters are all careful studies, some more 
detailed than others owing to the availability, or lack thereof, of comprehensive country-level data. 
Almost all the chapters follow a common prescription in methodology and in the formulation of the 
problem to be addressed, an obvious requirement for producing comparable findings in a cross-
national study. However, except for the overview and concluding chapters, the product from 
following a common recipe has the flavor of a set of reference volumes rather than an undertaking in 
which each chapter carries the potential of a new and revealing conceptualization, a different way of 
looking at these complex issues. In going through the volumes, the image in my mind often was one 
of tillers in the vineyard, each responsible for his furrow. The wine, however, is delicious, and students 
of globalization and work careers have been well served by this undertaking and in having these 
volumes available. 
 
EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON WORK VALUES 
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One exception to the regimented structure of the county chapters is the inclusion of a paper on values 
and attitudes in the volume on women's careers (Luck 2006). This is the sole chapter in the four 
volume Globalife study that does not conform with the programmatic nature of the report, in that it 
neither examines employment transitions in a particular country nor overviews career outcomes across 
the European states. Instead it addresses the impact of culture and religious belief systems on gender 
roles. More precisely, the intent of the chapter is to assess the differential roles played by culture and 
welfare regime institutions in the choices couples make about wife's employment and the division of 
household labor.  
 
Luck (2006 p. 416) argues that the cultural background of societies has shaped their institutional 
arrangements, but that cultural mores and religious belief systems continue to assert a direct effect on 
women's values. He also claims that compared with cultural background the impact of welfare regime 
effects is modest (Luck 2006, p. 419). I have issues with the adequacy of Luck's empirical analysis. 
These concern both his method of testing the relative effects of culture and structure, and the thinness 
of the empirical formulation for carrying the weight of rather strong claims. In my view, the 
contribution of Luck's chapter is not in his empirical findings but in raising an issue that deserves 
some thought; namely, the extent to which values are molded by institutional arrangements and the 
rate at which different sorts of values respond and adjust to changes in structural organization. 
 
Luck developed his thesis in reference to the writings of several social psychologists, especially Ronald 
Inglehart (1990; 1997). A recent edited volume (Ester, et. al. 2006a) delves into this body of research, 
with specific regard to the effects of globalization on value patterns in the European countries. This 
publication has two distinct sections. The first examines trends in various value domains; the second 
involves a comparison of the value systems developed by three prominent researchers--Ronald 
Inglehart, Shalom Schwartz, and Geert Hofstede. Only the first section is relevant to this essay and I 
further restrict attention to the chapters that discuss work values. 
 
The new work arrangements prompted by globalization have generated opportunities for career 
advancement as well as having been a cause of insecurity and anxiety. As made clear in the Globalife 
report, the press of globalization has led to the individualization of employment, fostering greater 
returns to education and eroding the potency of collectivist solutions to the provision of job security. 
In this context, national differences in work values might well differentiate among countries in terms 
of labor force adaptability and the capability of a citizenry to exploit the new economic possibilities. 
 
What, then, has been the course of value change in the European states? Ester, et. al. (2006b) examine 
work values in 12 European countries using three waves of the European Values Study (1981, 1990, 
1999/2000). One question they address concerns whether globalization has been eroding country 
differences, leading to value convergence. A second issue relates to the mechanics of value change, 
which they formulate in terms of whether there is evidence for differential socialization and 
generational replacement as the responsible process.  
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To pursue these matters Ester and his associates construct indices of extrinsic and intrinsic work 
values, a pair of categories that has a long tradition in social science research (e.g., Lenski 1963; 
Mortimer and Lorence 1979). In the present context, the motivation for this distinction derives from 
the view of Inglehart (1997) that value priorities in western countries have been shifting from 
materialist to post-materialist concerns; i.e., from a focus on survival needs to ones of individual 
freedom, personal growth, and aesthetic enhancement. Ester, et. al. (2006b, pp. 89-94) add the 
contention that a workforce that supports intrinsic values meshes well with the needs of employers in 
a global economy, where personal development, lifelong learning, and flexibility are esteemed. 
 
The main findings from their analysis suggest that there has been an increase in the salience of both 
intrinsic and extrinsic values in most European states, and there is evidence that much of the change 
derives from a process of generational replacement. Not surprisingly, the youngest cohort expresses 
most of the change in values; they, of course, are deeply vulnerable to the dislocations brought about 
by globalization. Further, in reviewing the change patterns in the various European countries, the 
authors find little support for a thesis of value convergence, as is suggested in some formulations of 
modernization theory (Ester, et. al. 2006c). 
 
However, inferring reasons for the value change from the reported analysis is rather difficult. For one 
matter, intrinsic work values are associated with educational attainment, and the shift toward a greater 
appreciation of intrinsic rewards may reflect little more than a continuation of the long term trend in 
schooling. One might claim that increased schooling is itself a response to globalization, but the rise in 
children’s educational attainment has been taking place for more than a century and reflects the 
decline in family size, growth of urbanization, and the emergence of skilled industrial occupations, all 
of which have largely predated the onset of globalization as a conscious concern. I would be interested 
in how intrinsic work values have changed net of trends in educational attainment, but it is not 
possible to assess this effect since the reported analysis does not include a control for education (Ester, 
et. al. 2006b, table 4.6). 
 
A more serious problem with the study is the failure to include institutional variables of the sort 
examined in the Globalife project. As a result, the authors have no theory of country differences in 
work values, aside from some consideration religion effects. Yet, an examination of country 
differences, as reported in the chapter, is suggestive of a patterning by welfare regime type. For 
example, focusing on the youngest generation in the 1999 wave--the group likely to be most affected 
by globalization--it is the case that they report a high emphasis on extrinsic values (a concern with 
earnings and job security) in Spain, Italy, and the US , but give them a lower rating in Denmark, 
Sweden, and the Netherlands (Ester, et. al. 2006b, table 4.4). This fits well with assessments of the 
career insecurities of youth, as discussed in Mills, et. al. (2005, pp. 423-29). In the case of Italy and 
Spain, the employment opportunities of young workers are limited because of the extensive shielding 
of the careers of established workers. In the northern European countries, young workers also take 
more time to secure standard employment contracts, but the availability of generous social benefits 
appears to cushion their economic uncertainty. 
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If this study of work values is oblivious to the literature on institutional effects, it is also the case that 
the Globalife volumes devote scant attention to work values. In short, the two literatures have 
proceeded like passing ships on a dark night. This neglect of the other has consequences for our 
comprehension of changes in work values, but also for developments in regard to work careers. With 
respect to work values, omission of a consideration of employment systems and welfare regimes 
detracts from an understanding of the mechanics by which the insecurities and anxieties generated by 
globalization are transformed into a stress upon certain values. Globalization, after all, is hardly a 
palpable phenomenon; rather, workers perceive its impact only after it is filtered by particular 
institutional arrangements, which can exacerbate or diminish their career and employment prospects. 
While feelings of insecurity and anxiety are not values, these dispositions impinge upon the salience of 
a construct such as extrinsic work values, which taps concerns about career and income. 
 
The relevance of values to an assessment of globalization’s effects on career features is more subtle. 
One can surmise, as Luck (2006, p. 416) does, that the cultural background of a society preceded and 
has shaped its institutional features, but this is an origin story and does not mean that country 
differences in work values continue to influence career outcomes once current work arrangements are 
taken into account. But country differences in value preferences surely affect the course of institutional 
adaptations to the unfolding of globalization, in both rate and in the form that the adjustments will 
take. Thus, while the imperatives of remaining competitive in a global economy may require frequent 
adaptations to new developments, it is value structures, especially in regard to work arrangements, that 
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